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The present study explores the dramatic projection of one’s own
views onto those of Jesus among conservative and liberal American
Christians. In a large-scale survey, the relevant views that each
group attributed to a contemporary Jesus differed almost as much
as their own views. Despite such dissonance-reducing projection,
however, conservatives acknowledged the relevant discrepancy
with regard to “fellowship” issues (e.g., taxation to reduce eco-
nomic inequality and treatment of immigrants) and liberals ac-
knowledged the relevant discrepancy with regard to “morality”
issues (e.g., abortion and gay marriage). However, conservatives
also claimed that a contemporary Jesus would be even more con-
servative than themselves on the former issues whereas liberals
claimed that Jesus would be even more liberal than themselves
on the latter issues. Further reducing potential dissonance, liberal
and conservative Christians differedmarkedly in the types of issues
they claimed to be more central to their faith. A concluding discus-
sion considers the relationship between individual motivational
processes and more social processes that may underlie the present
ﬁndings, as well as implications for contemporary social and polit-
ical conﬂict.
Men committed shameful acts with othermen, and received in themselves
the due penalty for their error (Romans 1:27,New InternationalVersion).
Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brothers,
you did it to me (Matthew 25:40, New International Version).
American Christians, both liberal and conservative, must dealwith conﬂict between the traditional dictates of their faith
and their personal political views and allegiances. This tension is
most obvious in the case of those who identify with the Christian
Right and the Republican Party. The exhortations of altruism,
fellowship, and the common bond of all humanity captured in the
quotation from Matthew convey a major theme of the New Tes-
tament, indeed one arguably much more central to the teachings
of Christ than the cultural issues that have served as the rallying
call for many Christian churches and television networks (1).
However, in the decades since the New Deal, the Republican
party, which has become ever more opposed to progressive tax-
ation, expenditures for social services, lenient treatment of illegal
immigrants and their families, and other policies designed to ease
the burdens of the least fortunate, has enjoyed increasing elec-
toral support from members of the Christian Right (2, 3). Liber-
ally inclined Christians, fewer in number, face a different chal-
lenge. They must reconcile their own, typically moderate views on
matters such as abortion and gay rights with the traditional
teachings of their church and the stern pronouncements of highly
visible religious spokespersons, as well as the views of the majority
of their fellow Christians.
The links between religious observance and politics has been
amply documented in many survey studies. For example, in the
1992 Presidential Election, religious traditionalism proved to be
the best predictor of Republican Party identiﬁcation, of conser-
vative ideology, and of voting for George H. W. Bush (4). A
decade later, during the 2004 Presidential Election, Americans
regularly attending religious services were more than three times
as likely to characterize themselves as conservative (45.2%) than
liberal (13.6%) (5), and, conversely, voters who never attended
religious services proved to be much more likely to cast their
ballot for John Kerry (63.4%) than for George W. Bush (36.6%).
This linkage is particularly clear in the speciﬁc case of Christians.
Many studies show that devout Christians are, on average, more
conservative than less devout Christians and more conservative
than secular Americans (2, 4, 6–8), a phenomenon Olson and
Green (5) term the “religion gap.”
Social scientists have posited two different pathways poten-
tially linking conservative ideology to Christianity (2, 9). First,
the same epistemic and existential needs that are served by re-
ligiosity may also be served by conservative ideology (10). In
particular, both religiosity and conservative ideology provide
“coherency, control, and the reduction of ambiguity” (ref. 11, p.
715; refs. 12–14). Second, the Republican Party in general and
right-wing politicians in particular increasingly have adopted
positions on speciﬁc “cultural” or moral issues such as abortion,
prayer in public schools, and the restriction of civil marriage to
heterosexual partners that are congruent with traditional Chris-
tian doctrine. Since the 1980 Presidential election, for example,
Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, James Dobson’s Focus on the
Family, and other like-minded groups comprising the Christian
Right have formally endorsed the Republican Party for its
stances on such issues. Once in the Republican fold, Christian
voters attracted primarily by these positions on cultural issues are
disproportionately exposed to, and come to adopt, the economic
positions of their political reference group (15, 16). This social
identity and peer inﬂuence account is further bolstered by evi-
dence that the connection between religiosity and the adoption
of conservative issue positions is heavily moderated by political
engagement (2, 9, 17).
The inﬂuence process, moreover, has been a mutual one.
Conservative Republicans are increasingly exposed to and inﬂu-
enced by the views of the Religious Right, and its insistence that
the GOP give heavy weight to religiously dictated positions in its
platform and choice of candidates (18). Indeed, religiosity has
become so linked to political conservatism that some scholars and
political pundits refer to the opposition between more devout,
religious Americans and those who are more secular as a “culture
war” (19–22)—with the main battleground provided by issues of
abortion, gay rights, and separation of church and state.
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The question of why such a linkage between religion and po-
litical conservatism exists, however, is less relevant to our present
concerns than the question of its psychological consequences.
More speciﬁcally, how have conservative Christians dealt with the
apparent incongruity between the dictates of their faith and the
economic and political policies that they, and their party of choice,
espouse? The drive for cognitive consistency has been a central
focus of social psychology for more than half a century (23–25),
and the phenomenon of rationalization has been noted by phi-
losophers, dramatists, novelists, and other keen-eyed observers of
human foibles for many centuries. However, it has been the theory
of cognitive dissonance (26), with its postulation of a speciﬁc
motivational process and its emphasis on clever laboratory
experiments and nonobvious predictions and demonstrations, that
has been most inﬂuential in shaping research (27–29).
An important aspect of dissonance theory is the stipulation of
the multiple ways in which dissonance can be reduced, and the
notion that the changes in attitudes, beliefs, or behavior most
likely to occur are ones that can be changed with least effort and
cost—particularly least cost to a positive image of the self (28).
Indeed, not just attitudes and behavior but also perceptions of
facts and events, and even notions of what is “real,” can be
dictated by existing needs, values, and priorities (30–32). More-
over, when other individuals see matters involving important
social and political beliefs differently, the result is denigration of
those others’ morality and even rationality. Attributions of bias
are made for those on the “other side” of issues (33–35).
Conservative and liberal Christians, like all liberals and con-
servatives, are inclined to denigrate those on the other side of the
political spectrum; and each side is convinced that the other side
is treated more leniently than their own side in the media, and by
other third parties that try to give an objective account of matters
under dispute (36–39). However, how have Christians on the two
sides of the political divide dealt with discrepancies between
their own political positions and the apparent dictates of their
faith? Some, no doubt, have felt pressure to moderate their
positions to achieve greater congruency with traditional Chris-
tian teachings. Others may have narrowed their reference group
and, for those whose faith is highly central to their personal
identity, engaged in attempts at persuasion and proselytism.
However, we argue and attempt to demonstrate empirically,
contemporary American Christians also have adjusted their
perceptions of Christianity itself. More speciﬁcally, they have
adjusted their perceptions of the political positions that Jesus of
the New Testament would hold if he were alive today.
A provocative series of studies by Epley and colleagues
showed that the egocentric tendency to believe that others share
one’s beliefs is more pronounced when individuals are asked
about God than when they are asked about the average Amer-
ican or various prominent individuals (40). The present research
is distinct from those studies insofar as its focus is more specif-
ically on such “projection” in the views and also the priorities
that liberal and conservative Christians attribute to Jesus Christ.
Our speciﬁc hypotheses are very much in the dissonance tradi-
tion (26). The dissonance researchers reversed conventional
formulations by focusing not on the effects of attitudes on be-
havior but on the effects of behavior on subsequent attitudes. We
essentially reverse conventional formulations by focusing not on
the effects of religion on political views but the effects of political
views on the content of religious beliefs.
Predictions
First and foremost, we predict that Christian liberals and con-
servatives will differ in how conservative vs. liberal the views are
that they attribute to Jesus.
A second prediction is that the two groups will differ in the
issues they see as most central to their notion of Christianity (and
presumably the issues that would be most important to Jesus if
he lived today)—issues of fellowship and compassion in the case
of Christian liberals and issues of conventional morality in the
case of Christian conservatives.
We also predict that, although liberals will claim that Jesus
would be more conservative than themselves on morality issues
and conservatives will claim that Jesus would be more liberal
than themselves on fellowship issues, the groups will differ in the
priority they assign to Christian teaching on these issues in a way
that serves to reduce potential dissonance with respect to their
own views. Speciﬁcally, liberals will assign greater priority to
fellowship issues and conservatives will assign greater priority to
morality issues.
We further predict that the group differences hypothesized here
will be more pronounced among individuals who see their Chris-
tianity as central rather than noncentral to their personal identity.
A ﬁnal prediction is one that follows not from dissonance
theory but from the idealization of Jesus and the recognition of
personal limitations. We predict that, on the issues that most
deﬁne their religious identity, liberal and conservative Christians
alike will impute positions to Jesus that are even more extreme
than their own.
Results
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding of note (although not one directly relevant to our
predictions) is the strong association between participants’ con-
servatism and the centrality of Christian identity to their sense of
self (Table 1). That is, self-identiﬁed conservatives (classiﬁed on
the basis of a simple median split) proved much more likely than
liberals to see their religious identity as very central and much less
likely to see it as not at all central [χ2(2, n = 474) = 54.74; P <
0.001]. The strength of the association, we found, is essentially
unchanged when more stringent criterion (i.e., top versus bottom
tertile) is used to classify participants with respect to political
identity [χ2(2, n = 361) = 55.7; P < 0.001]. The correlation (r)
between religious identity and political ideology was 0.35
(P < 0.001).
Characterizations of Own Political Ideology and That of Jesus. As
predicted, conservatives and liberals differed dramatically in the
way they characterized Jesus’ views “in general” on the relevant
rating scale (with a score of 1 representing “extreme liberal” and
a score of 100 representing “extreme conservative”). Indeed, as
apparent in Table 2, the difference in characterizations of Jesus’
views was almost as great (mean D = 56.34 points) as the differ-
ence in self-characterizations on the same scale (mean D = 45.84
points). The correlation reﬂecting such projection of own views on
Jesus was also extremely high (r= 0.70) and proved to be stronger
(r = 0.76) among survey participants who reported themselves to
be strongly rather than somewhat or not at all identiﬁed with their
Christianity (r = 0.55 among those somewhat or not at all iden-
tiﬁed with their Christianity; z = 4.07; P < 0.001). Despite this
dramatic difference in perceptions of the overall views of Jesus,
the liberal Christians in our sample did characterize Jesus as
somewhat less liberal than themselves [t(212) = −3.32; P < 0.01],
and conservatives did characterize Jesus as somewhat less con-
servative than themselves [t(253) = 2.69; P < 0.001].
Our subsequent analyses, which distinguish “fellowship” and
“morality” issues of the sort that currently pit American liberals
Table 1. Political self-classiﬁcation and centrality of Christian
identity
Group n
Christian identity (%)
Not at all central Somewhat central Very central
Liberals 213 47 (22.1) 88 (41.3) 78 (36.6)
Conservatives 261 16 (6.1) 65 (24.9) 180 (69.0)
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against conservatives, sharpen our appreciation of the views, and
of the projections of own views onto those of Jesus, that underlie
these in-general ratings.
Characterizations of Own Views and Jesus’ Views Regarding
Fellowship Issues. We ﬁrst consider the two fellowship issues that
pertain to matters of economics and generosity to disadvantaged
groups—speciﬁcally increasing the tax burden on the rich to ease
the plight of the poor and easing the ability of current illegal
immigrants to gain citizenship and access to social services. On
both issues, we again see dramatic evidence of projection of own
views onto those of Jesus. In the case of economic redistribution
through increased taxes for the wealthy (Fig. 1), we see a liberal–
conservative difference of 42.60 points on our 100-point scale with
respect to views attributed to Jesus—a difference that is almost
identical to the point difference of 44.76 between liberals and
conservatives themselves. We also see a correlation (r) of 0.69
between own views and those imputed to Jesus (r = 0.74 if we
include only strongly self-identiﬁed Christians). In the case of
easing the burdens of illegal immigrants (Fig. 1), we see a pattern
of ﬁndings that is similar although less dramatic—that is, a mean
difference of 36.80 points between self and Jesus and a 41.69-
point difference in the two groups’ own views, and a correlation
between own views and those attributed to Jesus of 0.57 (r= 0.59
if we include only strongly self-identiﬁed Christians). All these
differences in ratings offered by liberals versus conservatives, and
related correlations, are statistically signiﬁcant well beyond the
0.001 level.
Further examination of the means in these two ﬁgures reveals
that, despite such projection of views, conservative Christians do
see their own views as less “liberal” than those they attribute to
Jesus and thus at odds with Jesus’ teaching on fellowship and
compassion for the needy and less fortunate [t(236) = −2.72 (P <
0.001) and t(240) = −6.98 (P < 0.001), respectively]. What is
more notable, however, is the discrepancy between own views
and those attributed to Jesus by liberals. That is, as predicted,
liberals see Jesus’ views on these issues as even more extreme in
the direction of greater compassion and fellowship—i.e., as even
more liberal—than their own [t(211) = −2.17 (P < 0.05) and
t(210) = −5.54 (P < 0.001), respectively].
Characterizations of Own Views and Jesus’ Views Regarding Morality
Issues.When we turn our attention to the two issues pertaining to
moral conduct—opposition to gay marriage and restriction of
access to abortion—we see further dramatic evidence of pro-
jection of own views onto those of Jesus, with a pattern of spe-
ciﬁc means that is essentially the mirror image of that seen for
the two fellowship issues. In the case of deﬁnition of marriage to
exclude same-sex couples (Fig. 2), we see a between-group dif-
ference of 45.37 points on the 100-point scale with respect to the
presumed views of Jesus—a difference that is only modestly
smaller than the difference in the two groups of participants’
ratings of their own views (54.43 points)—and a correlation be-
tween the two ratings of 0.75 (r = 0.79 if we include only strongly
self-identiﬁed Christians). In the case of restricting grounds for
abortion (Fig. 2), we see a similar data pattern, that is, a mean
between-group difference of 48.16 points with respect to Jesus’
views compared with a between-group difference of 31.6 points
with respect to own views, and a correlation of 0.63 (r = 0.74 if
we include only strongly self-identiﬁed Christians). All these
between-group differences and correlations again are statistically
signiﬁcant well beyond the 0.001 level.
Further examination reveals that, despite the relevant pro-
jection of views the liberal Christians in our study did see their
own views on gay marriage and abortion as more liberal than
those they attribute to Jesus [t(210) = 8.03 (P < 0.001) and
t(208) = 11.69 (P < 0.001), respectively], and thus at odds with
the latter (as well as with the views of the most visible leaders of
many Christian denominations). What is more notable, in the
case of these issues, is the discrepancy between own views and
those attributed to Jesus by Christian conservatives. That is, as
predicted, conservatives see Jesus’ views on these two issues as
even more extreme in the direction of stricter morality—i.e.,
more conservative—than their own [t(244) = 5.58 (P < 0.001)
and t(237) = 6.98 (P < 0.001), respectively].
Table 2. Comparison of liberals’ and conservatives’
characterizations of own vs. Jesus’ political views in general
View Liberals Conservatives Difference
Jesus 26.98 72.82 45.84
Self 20.75 77.09 56.34
Difference +6.23 −4.27 —
Fig. 1. Comparison of liberals’ and conservatives’ characterizations of own versus Jesus’ political views with regard to fellowship issues.
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Importance of Morality vs. Fellowship in Personal Views of Christianity.
How did our survey respondents rationalize the discrepancy be-
tween their own political views and the teachings of the Gospel? As
predicted, both liberal and conservative Christians did so in part by
projecting their own views onto Jesus in a way that reduced such
discrepancy. Did they, as hypothesized, further reduce dissonance
by projecting their priorities onto Jesus? That is, did they deﬁne the
issues on which their views were essentially aligned with Christian
doctrine as more central to their faith than those on which their
views were at odds with such doctrine? Did they, in other words,
believe that a contemporary Jesus would share their views about
what aspects of Christian teachings are most essential?
A slim majority of our liberal Christian respondents and a
somewhat greater majority of our conservative Christian re-
spondents claimed that Jesus’ teachings on personal morality and
his teachings on fellowship and caring for the less fortunate were
equally important aspects of being a good Christian. However, the
participants who were willing to claim otherwise offered strong
support for our hypothesis (Table 3). In particular, more than
three times as many liberals rated fellowship and caring to be
more important aspects than morality than vice versa (40.7% vs.
9.1%). By contrast, conservatives were slightly more likely to
rated morality as more important (20.6%) than fellowship
[13.6%; χ2(2, n = 451) = 45.72; P < 0.001].
Moreover, this difference between liberal and conservative
Christians proved to be more apparent among those who
claimed Christianity to be “very central” to their identity than to
those who claimed it to be only “somewhat central” or “not at all
central” to their identity. Among those claiming Christianity to
be very central, 10 times as many liberals rated fellowship
teaching as a more important aspect of their faith than morality
teaching (i.e., 39.5% vs. 3.9%), whereas fewer such conservatives
(11.4%) thought fellowship teaching to be more important than
morality teaching than vice versa [i.e., 11.4% vs. 19.5%; χ2(2, n=
242) = 30.30; P < 0.001]. In the case of participants assigning a less
central role to their faith, only three times as many liberals rated
fellowship teachings as more important than morality teachings
(i.e., 41.40% vs. 12.03%), and the same percentage of conservatives
rated fellowship teaching as more important than morality teach-
ings as vice versa [i.e., 20.4% in both cases; χ2(2, n= 209) = 12.48;
P < 0.01].
Catholics vs. Protestants. In reporting results, we have not distin-
guished between Protestants and Catholics (or between different
Protestant denominations). However, it is worth noting at least
parenthetically that, although Catholics and Protestants were
equally likely to identify as conservative rather than liberal [χ2(2,
n = 409) = 0.37], the projection of views we have described was
generally more pronounced among Protestants than Catholics.
Across the four issues considered, the average absolute difference
between a given participant’s own self-reported conservatism on
the issue and that attributed to Jesus was 23.58 points among
Catholics and only 19.41 points among Protestants [t(400) = 2.48;
P < 0.05]. Also, the tendency for conservatives to attach relatively
greater importance to morality than fellowship issues than liberals
was more pronounced in the case of Protestants (means of 3.73
and 4.50, respectively) than in the case of Catholics (means of 3.83
and 4.08, respectively). When these responses were regressed on
ideological identity, Christian denomination, and the interaction
between the two, the interaction effect we found approached
statistical signiﬁcance (b = 0.52; P = 0.06).
Discussion
Our survey data speak to the dissonance that contemporary
American Christians, whether liberal or conservative, confront
between their own political views and the traditional teachings
and tenets of their faith. They also shed light on the differing
views that the two groups attribute to the central ﬁgure of their
faith—and in so doing reduce their dissonance and maintain
their sense of personal coherence and integrity.
Consistent with the reports of previous researchers, conser-
vative views were more common than liberal ones among our
respondents. Moreover, greater centrality of Christian identity
among participants was associated with greater self-reported
Fig. 2. Comparison of liberals’ and conservatives’ characterizations of own versus Jesus’ political views with regard to morality issues.
Table 3. Rated importance of Jesus’ teachings on fellowship
versus morality
Group
Relative importance (%)
Fellowship more
important
Equally
important
Morality more
important
Liberals 85 (40.7) 105 (50.2) 19 (9.1)
Conservatives 33 (13.6) 159 (65.7) 50 (20.6)
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conservatism. However, our most dramatic ﬁnding involved the
marked projection of own views onto those attributed to Jesus.
Indeed, the difference in the views that liberal and conservative
participants claimed that Jesus would espouse were he alive to-
day were almost as great as the difference that these groups
reported with respect to their own views—both in general and
with respect to the four speciﬁc issues that divide contemporary
liberals and conservatives.
As one might expect, Christian conservatives acknowledged
that their views deviated somewhat from those they attributed
Jesus and the Gospels with respect to “fellowship” issues of re-
ducing economic inequality through taxation and more generous
treatment of illegal immigrants. Liberal Christians acknowledged
similar deviation with respect to the “morality” issues of abortion
and gay marriage. However, a less obvious discrepancy was also
noteworthy. Liberals claimed that Jesus would be even more
liberal than themselves on the two fellowship issues, and con-
servatives claimed Jesus would be even more conservative than
themselves on the two morality issues. The former is perhaps to
be expected given that charitable treatment of the less fortunate
is so central a tenet of the Gospel and the speciﬁc teaching of
Jesus—one which most Christians, liberals and conservatives
alike, would admit that they do not honor to the extent called for
in those teachings. The latter is less obvious. Although the bib-
lical injunctions on these morality issues are prominent in the
Christian bible, they are not obviously tied to the speciﬁc
teachings of Jesus. (Indeed, note the famous injunctions in John
8:7, “Let him who is without sin cast the ﬁrst stone”; and in
Matthew 7:1, “Judge not lest ye be judged.”)
Beyond projection of their own views on speciﬁc issues to
Jesus, many of our participants displayed an additional source of
dissonance reduction. A slim majority of liberals and a clear
majority of conservatives claimed Jesus’ teachings (and the ten-
ets of their religion) on fellowship and on morality were equally
central to their personal religious views. However, among survey
respondents who claimed otherwise, especially those who
claimed their Christianity to be central to their personal identity,
liberals were much more likely to attach greater weight to
teachings and tenets involving issues of fellowship, whereas
conservatives were somewhat more likely to attach greater
weight to teaching and tenets involving issues of morality.
Issues of Generalizability. An obvious caveat is in order because of
our reliance on SurveyMonkey to generate our sample of
respondents, and thus the potential problem of self-selection.
Although any survey obviously involves a degree of self-selection
(especially one on religious and political views), the use of this
relatively inexpensive service in research is still quite new, and
the particular biases it introduces have yet to be systematically
studied. However, there is no obvious reason why our sample
would be particularly prone to show the types of projection and
dissonance-reducing expressions of religious priorities docu-
mented in the present study.
A further issue involves the extent to which our ﬁndings reﬂect
something about the speciﬁc nature and history of American
politics and its links to religious faith. Would similar patterns of
response on the part of conservative versus liberal Christians be
equally evident in countries like Canada or Australia, which
share religious afﬁliations and most important aspects of culture
with the United States but not a political divide that assigns so
prominent a role to the speciﬁc issues of abortion and gay
marriage? Answering this empirical question would help to
clarify the role that political and social processes play in pro-
moting dissonance-reducing views about the views of Jesus.
Another question of generalizability arises because liberal and
conservative Christians in the United States typically belong to
different churches, are exposed to different sermons, and are
subject to the social inﬂuence of very different reference groups.
Examining liberal and conservative Christians’ views outside the
United Stats about other issues that have been a particular focus
in American politics might be similarly instructive.
Framing issues are obviously important as well. Christian con-
servatives who oppose economic redistribution donate heavily to
charitable causes endorsed by their denominations. Moreover,
conservatives within some Christian denominations, whom one
might expect to share general conservative views about environ-
mental protections policies advocated by governmental bodies
and the science community at large, have responded positively to
messages framed in terms of the obligation of “stewardship” or
“creation care.”
Causal Direction and Individual vs. Collective Processes. The most
obvious question raised by our speciﬁc ﬁndings and the more
general correlation between religious and political views is that
of causal direction. To some extent, liberal and conservative
Christians may, as we postulate, have made dissonance-reducing
adjustments in their perceptions of the teachings of Jesus and
their views about what is central vs. noncentral to their personal
faith. However, to some extent, liberal and conservative Chris-
tians may have responded to fellowship and moral issues in
a manner that reﬂects the differing importance members of these
two groups personally attach to particular aspects of Christian
doctrine. Also, some third variable—in particular, the nature of
the reference groups provided by family and community, or
perhaps some psychological factor like deference to authority—
may, to some extent, have mediated both.
We obviously cannot assess the relative importance of these
alternatives with the type of correlational data provided by our
present survey. Moreover, we suspect that the answer to this
question is unlikely to be a simple one. Family and reference
group and perhaps even chance can inﬂuence the view of
Christianity to which the individual is exposed. Subsequent
experiences and subsequent reﬂection can reinforce earlier views
or can lead to a questioning of earlier religious and/or political
views and prompt a change in group membership. In either case,
as we have noted, liberal and conservative Christians face
problems of dissonance reduction. In this regard, it is important
to note that, whereas dissonance theory emphasized processes
assumed to take place in the mind of the individual, when re-
ligious and political views are involved, it is likely that dissonance
reduction takes place as a collective enterprise. Denominational
leaders emphasize or deemphasize particular teachings and
tenets, and in so doing, increase or decrease pressures on indi-
viduals to confront particular discrepancies between those
teachings and tenets and their personal views and practices. The
faithful discuss matters among themselves, and are apt to re-
inforce each other’s ways of justifying those views and practices,
and particular sins of omission and commission.
Although our present data do little to resolve this question of
causal direction, their main import lies in documenting the
strength of the claimed correspondence between own views and
priorities and those attributed to Jesus—a correspondence,
whatever its origins, that can obviously serve to help individuals
avoid or reduce potential dissonance. Future research in which
investigators manipulate the salience of potential discrepancies
between participants’ own views and scriptural dictates could tell
us whether increasing the magnitude of dissonance increases
such projection. However, such research would not really tell us
how important that causal pathway has been relative to other
causal pathways in producing the strikingly different ways in
which contemporary liberal and conservative American Chris-
tians construe the teachings of Jesus.
Implications of Residual Dissonance for Intergroup Conﬂict. How do
American Christians of the left and right deal with discrepancies
that remain between important tenets of their religion and their
3620 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1117557109 Ross et al.
politics? Liberals can comfortably embrace the fellowship mes-
sage of the Gospels—even conceding that they personally fall
short of its demands—and insist that the Christian Right’s pro-
nouncements on homosexuality and abortion are not the tenets
of Christianity that they choose to embrace or the ones most
emphasized in the teachings of Jesus. Conservatives, especially
insofar as they report their faith and their personal relationship
with Jesus to be so central to their identity, face a more difﬁcult
dilemma. They can hardly claim that their allegiance is less to the
New Testament, which is the main authority for their cultural
views, than to the Old Testament.
Does the heated rhetoric that conservatives use in derogating
liberals—including fellow Christians—and the energy they de-
vote to proselytism reﬂect further attempts at dissonance re-
duction? In this context, it is worth recalling that, before the
1970s, Christian political movements in the United States were
largely progressive. Notably, the Christian leaders in the North
were the most vocally opposed to slavery in the New World; and
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, headed by
Martin Luther King, was similarly associated with the left in its
efforts at desegregation and addressing the needs of minorities
and the poor. Elements of the Catholic Church in America
(including the Catholic Workers Party founded by Dorothy Day
and Peter Maurin in 1933) similarly have long been associated
with workers’ rights and antiwar movements.
Is the relative weakness of the once-powerful Christian left
a sign that the many liberals of Christian background have re-
duced dissonance by moving away from the mainstream of their
church and focusing on more secular values? Is their derogation
of Christian conservatives as hypocrites or dupes of wealthy GOP
supporters who care more about their pocketbooks than the
teachings of Jesus a reﬂection of further dissonance reduction on
their part? Again, our present ﬁndings do not answer these
questions. However, we hope they can serve as an impetus to
research that seeks such answers.
Materials and Methods
Survey participants were 1,256 respondents from the SurveyMonkey.com
panel. The panel consists of many thousands of individuals who participate in
surveys in exchange for a small donation to a charity of their choice as well as
a chance to win $100. The present survey was randomly assigned to a subset
of the SurveyMonkey panel.
Of the 1,256 respondents, 787 identiﬁed themselves as Christian, and those
that did so were asked to further specify their denomination. Of these
Christian respondents, 440 (56%) identiﬁed themselves as Protestant and 221
(28%) identiﬁed themselves as Catholic—proportions quite comparable to
those reported for these two major Christian denominations by major survey
organizations. Respondents who had indicated that they were Christian
were also asked, “How central is Christianity to your identity?” (very central,
somewhat central, not at all central). The data analyses reported here deal
solely with the responses of this sample of self-identiﬁed Christians.
Participants were also asked about their beliefs about the existence of an
afterlife, their viewabout thedivineornondivine statusof the scriptures, and the
frequencywithwhichtheypray.However,thisreportdoesnotconsiderresponses
totheseitems.Rather, it focusedonthequestionsthataskedthemtocharacterize
the liberalism/conservatism of their own political views and the views they
thoughtwould be expressed by Jesus (if hewere alive today) by using a series of
100-point scales (with a score of 1 representing the most extreme liberal and
a score of 100 representing the most extreme conservative). The ﬁrst such item
pertained to views in general. The other four items pertained to views on two
hotly debated issues that pertained to matters of fellowship and serving the
needy anddisadvantaged (i.e., “increasing the taxburdenon the rich toease the
plight of the poor” and “easing the ability of current ‘illegal immigrants’ to gain
citizenship and access social services”) and to views on two that hotly debated
“cultural/moral” issues (i.e., “restricting abortion access” and deﬁning marriage
to include only that between a man and a woman, i.e., no “gay marriage”).
Respondents were further asked to indicate, on a seven-point scale, whether, in
their view, Jesus’ “teachings onpersonalmorality or teachingson fellowshipand
caring for the less fortunate” constituted the most important aspect of being
a good Christian (with 1 representing a view that morality is much more im-
portant and 7 representing a view that fellowship is much more important).
Participants also indicated their assessment of political views of the Fox
News and CNN. Those rating Fox News as more liberal “in general” than CNN
(n = 112) were removed from all analyses because we could not be conﬁdent
that they had closely attended to, and understood, the content of questions
posed or had not deliberately offered perverse responses in the remainder
of the questionnaire. An additional 174 participants were excluded in
comparisons of liberals and conservatives because they placed themselves at
the exact midpoint of our scale.
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